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DIRECTOR of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Key Intelligence Questions  
For  
Fiscal Year 1975

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9 August 1974

DCI/NIO 1751-74

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**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**  
**KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS**  
**for**  
**FISCAL YEAR 1975**

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\*There were five substantive objectives submitted by the DCI with his letter to the President of June 18, 1974. They were not numbered; but the order in which they appear here, and hence the ordering of these groups of Key Intelligence Questions, follows the sequence of that June 18 submission.

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## Key Intelligence Questions For FY 1975

### Introduction

1. These Key Intelligence Questions are designed to be responsive to and to support the Substantive Objectives of the Intelligence Community for FY 1975 as noted by the United States Intelligence Board on June 13, 1974, prior to the submission of those Objectives to the President.

2. The Key Intelligence Questions for Fiscal Year 1975 are issued as guidance to the Intelligence Community for the collection and production of intelligence on subjects of major importance to national-level intelligence consumers during FY 1975. These Key Intelligence Questions obviously do not exhaust the universe of consumer needs; there are additional important categories of intelligence collection and production which are not included in this priority national intelligence guidance:

(a) *Lower priority national intelligence subjects:* These are deliberately omitted in order to emphasize the importance of the Key Intelligence Questions. It is recognized that some attention must be devoted to lower priority subjects, such as developments in Africa, although wherever possible less expensive and less difficult collection techniques should be employed. A level of attention must also be devoted to countries and issues deemed likely to become important some years from now, even though they may not pose immediate or pressing major problems during FY 1975.

(b) *Departmental and tactical intelligence:* This includes the intelligence requirements of the operational commanders, as well as certain warning and surveillance activities. An appropriate portion of the national intelligence effort must be devoted to meeting these needs, and the National Foreign Intelligence Budget Recommendations will take them into account. Continuing efforts will be made to improve the interaction and mutual support of national and tactical intelligence programs so that the needs of each level may be served by the same activities to the maximum extent possible. In framing these Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1975, careful consideration was also paid to departmental objectives with national implications or overtones. The Critical Near-Term Defense Intelligence Objectives of the Department of Defense were given special attention.

3. The Key Intelligence Questions are circulated for the following purposes:

(a) *First*, to insure that these subjects are given priority in the regular collection and production activities of appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community.

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(b) *Second*, to enable review of collection and production planning by the member agencies of the Intelligence Community via a brief, succinct report prepared on each KIQ under the aegis of the appropriate National Intelligence Officer. In a few cases involving subjects of particular importance, a supplementary, more detailed review will highlight specific matters deemed appropriate for special collection or production attention.

(c) *Third*, to provide the basis for a recapitulation and evaluation, after the close of the fiscal year, of the performance of the Intelligence Community—and of individual agencies—on each of the Key Intelligence Questions.

(d) *Fourth*, to permit the conclusions drawn from the recapitulation and evaluation of the FY 1975 effort to be used as factors in Community resource allocations, and in the preparation of the National Foreign Intelligence Budget Recommendations which the Director of Central Intelligence will be sending to the President in November 1976.

4. The Key Intelligence Questions have been grouped, where possible, under one of the five *Substantive Objectives* for the Intelligence Community as submitted to the President by the Director of Central Intelligence. The order in which the FY 1975 questions are listed should not be regarded as implying an internal priority: by definition, all the *Key Intelligence Questions* are of major importance.

5. Additions or modifications to the Key Intelligence Questions may be issued from time to time during FY 1975, if major changes in the international situation or the foreign intelligence environment should so dictate.

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## **Substantive Objectives and Key Intelligence Questions**

### **Substantive Objective**

*To provide reliable, timely and comprehensive assessments of Soviet policies and intentions in the political, security and economic fields, to include the dynamics of and factors affecting Soviet leadership and decision making.\**

### **Key Intelligence Questions**

#### **Soviet Political Dynamics**

1. What major trends and changes are likely in Soviet foreign policies relating to the US?

Include the Soviet perception of the level, nature and geographic focus of the competition with the US.

2. What internal trends and developments—including factions and policy differences in decision-making circles—are likely to affect Soviet behavior, both in the near and long terms?

3. What are the policies and activities of the Soviet Union with respect to maintaining and expanding its influence in Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area?

4. What are the capabilities, intentions and expectations of the two sides in the Sino-Soviet relationship—conflict, confrontation, reconciliation or continued uneasy stalemate?

Include reporting on any qualitative or quantitative changes in the military balance between the USSR and China, particularly changes that might indicate an increasing likelihood of hostilities.

5. What are Soviet economic policies toward the developed nations?

Particular attention should be given to the importation of technology. Large-scale trade in food and materials is also highly important.

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\*The Substantive Objectives set forth in italic type are the five Substantive Objectives for FY 1975 submitted by the DCI with his letter to the President of June 18, 1974.

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## **Substantive Objective**

*To provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments of current and future Soviet military and political capabilities to exert influence or power outside the USSR, especially with respect to the United States, its forces and its allies, and other key areas such as the Middle East and China. In particular, monitor Soviet compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation agreements, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction and similar negotiations.*

## **Key Intelligence Questions**

### **Soviet Strategic Objectives**

6. What are Soviet objectives, policies, deployment plans and perceptions relating to strategic weapons and the strategic balance?

### **Soviet ICBM Systems**

7. What are the accuracies of the Soviet SS-X-16, 17, 18 and 19 ICBM systems?

8. What progress are the Soviets making, and what are their objectives, in increasing the counterforce capability and survivability of their ICBM forces?

9. Are the Soviets developing land-mobile ICMBs; and if so, what progress is being made?

### **Soviet Nuclear Weapons**

✓ 10. What doctrine and plans do the Soviets have for the deployment, command and control, and use of nuclear forces, including Soviet reactions to US policy on selective uses of nuclear weapons?

11. What are Soviet objectives in nuclear weapons technology, and what progress are the Soviets making in this area?

### **Soviet Long Range and Naval Aviation**

12. What is the intended size, role and armament of the Backfire force?

13. What progress have the Soviets made in development of improved tankers, a follow-on heavy bomber and air-launched stand-off weapons?

### **Soviet Naval Systems**

14. What programs do the Soviets have to increase SLBM capabilities against the United States by deployment of DELTA/SS-N-8 submarines, development and deployment of follow-on SSBN systems, and/or changes in SSBN operational practices and patrol areas, and command and control capabilities?

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15. What progress are the Soviets making in expanding their international political influence through the use of their distant fleet operations and sea-power presence?

16. What progress have the Soviets made in development of follow-on anti-ship missile systems?

Include the characteristics of the guidance systems.

17. What progress are the Soviets making toward acquisition of an effective capability for open ocean submarine detection and localization?

Pay particular attention to progress in non-acoustic sensors.

18. What is the status of Soviet RDT&E, and what progress is being made toward deployment of, and reporting improvements in, a satellite-borne ocean surveillance system?

#### **Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses**

OW ✓ 19. What progress are the Soviets making in ABM development, and what are their plans for further deployment?

OW ✓ 20. What is the status of Soviet development of a look down/shoot down capability for interceptor aircraft and improved air defense warning and control systems?

21. What progress are the Soviets making toward strategic defense applications of lasers and beam weapons?

#### **Soviet Weapons Acquisition Process**

22. What are the costs of Soviet and Warsaw Pact weapons systems and defense programs, and how do these costs affect Soviet defense decision making?

Include information on how the Soviet weapons research and development and acquisition processes work.

#### **Arms Agreement Negotiations**

23. What are Soviet and Warsaw Pact objectives and positions in arms limitations negotiations?

24. What are Soviet and Warsaw Pact intentions and actions with respect to adherence to arms limitations agreements with the United States?

#### **Europe: Warsaw Pact—NATO—MBFR**

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25. What are the size and composition of the Warsaw Pact forces in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA)?

This information must be in sufficient detail to support the MBFR negotiations. It must include identification and location of all Warsaw

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25X6A Pact military units and installations in the NGA; aggregate manpower levels of [REDACTED] Warsaw Pact ground and air forces personnel in the NGA; [REDACTED] Warsaw Pact ground forces in the NGA (with a breakdown of personnel assigned to combat, rear services, command and support activities); composition of [REDACTED] 25X6A

25X6A [REDACTED] Warsaw Pact air and air defense forces, listing personnel by service and function; aggregate counts of key items of equipment—tanks, aircraft, artillery, nuclear weapons and missiles—in the NGA by force and country; and Warsaw Pact unit TOE data.

#### Warsaw Pact—NATO Balance


26. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Warsaw Pact forces for theater war?

The information must include the combat effectiveness of ground forces, frontal aviation and—in Eastern Europe—national air defense forces as well as Pact perceptions of NATO strengths and weaknesses.

27. What are Warsaw Pact views, plans and doctrine for conducting war in Central Europe, including readiness, mobilization commitment and reinforcement of Pact forces?

28. What are Warsaw Pact capabilities to fight a sustained non-nuclear war in Europe, including critical stockpiles and the operation of the rear services?

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#### Eastern Europe

30. What are the prospects for Yugoslavia following the departure of Tito?

Consider especially the potential political role of the Yugoslav armed forces, and Soviet efforts to increase Russian influence.

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### Substantive Objective

*Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments of Chinese internal and external policies and capabilities with respect to the United States, its allies, the USSR, Southeast Asia and the Third World.*

### Key Intelligence Questions

#### China: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy

31. What major trends and changes are likely in Chinese foreign policies relating to the US and the USSR?

32. While Mao and/or Chou remain alive, how are the internal stresses and relationships within the upper echelons of the Party likely to affect China's main lines of foreign, economic and military policy? Should Mao and/or Chou die, how are these policies likely to be affected by the succession process?

33. What are Peking's attitudes and objectives regarding the US' and USSR's role in Asia, and Peking's intentions toward attaining a role as leader of the Third World?

Include what progress Peking is making and how these Third World activities affect its support of revolutionary movements in the less developed countries.

#### Chinese Military Capabilities

34. What is the present status of China's nuclear capabilities?

Include the types and locations of delivery vehicles, the numbers and types of weapons in stockpile and weapons technology.

35. What progress are the Chinese making toward acquiring missile capabilities against the US and against the USSR west of the Urals?

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## Substantive Objective

*Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments on political and security situations or crises significantly affecting US interests or requiring US action (e.g., Arab-Israeli relations, South and Southeast Asia, the European Community, Latin America.)*

## Key Intelligence Questions

### The Middle East and South Asia

✓ 36. What are [REDACTED] Arab (especially Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, Saudi and Palestinian) views on and strategies toward the major issues of a peace settlement?

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✓ 37. What are Arab [REDACTED] military capabilities, plans and intentions?

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✓ 38. What are the threats to the political stability of major Middle East countries, and the points of conflict and cooperation between countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran?

Include major developments in the Middle East which could have a significant effect on the success of US programs for economic cooperation.

39. What indications are there of internal and regional instability in South Asia, especially concerning India?

### Southeast Asia


40. What are Communist intentions and capabilities in Indochina and Thailand?

Are the USSR and/or China willing to support major hostilities, particularly on the part of the North Vietnamese?

What are Soviet and Chinese interests in the area?

41. Will non-Communist elements in Indochina and Thailand be able to maintain internal stability and will they continue to cooperate with the US?

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
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### Korea

43. What developments within North and South Korea are likely to adversely affect the political, economic or military balance on the peninsula?

Include how these developments might significantly increase the possibility of hostile action by Pyongyang or, short of that, substantially increase pressure for greater US involvement in or support of South Korea.



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### Western Europe

✓ 45. How do the new leaders in Western Europe weigh the compatibilities and contradictions between "Atlanticism" and "Europeanism"?

Include the effects of domestic considerations (including political opposition, especially in cases where Communist parties are large or influential) and what these attitudes imply for Europe's external relations, participation in NATO and European defense cooperation. Also include the role and influence of inter-governmental (e.g., the EC, NATO, Eurogroup, WEU) and non-governmental (e.g., labor unions and federations, management groups, etc.) organizations and leaders.

✓ 46. What are West European policies, strengths and vulnerabilities in their relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in trade, political and security terms?

Include the impact of US policies toward the East on West European policies, and how various East-West negotiations (CSCE, MBFR) fit into West European concepts of the overall fabric of detente.

✓ 47. How do national and international economic problems—such as inflation, employment and trade balance questions—and related social pressures impinge on European domestic politics and on the foreign and defense policies and options of the principal European states?

The critical situations in Italy [redacted] are of particular concern.

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✓ 48. What are the major trends in politics and policies in Portugal and its African territories under the new regime, and in Spain, as the transition from Franco comes closer?

✓ 49. What are the implications of developments in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey for US and NATO political and security interests?

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**Latin America**

50. What are the reactions of governments and interest groups, particularly in Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Venezuela and Mexico, to current US initiatives toward Latin America?

51. What will be Latin American policies and attitudes—especially in multi-lateral forums, international or regional—on issues of importance to the US?

Include what blocs or alignments are being formed among the Latin American states.

52. What major actions are likely to be taken against US economic interests in Latin America?

Include attitudes toward US investments in Latin American countries.

53. What are Panama's intentions and bargaining vulnerabilities in negotiations for a new Canal Treaty or related agreements?

Include the willingness and ability of the Torrijos government to make concessions and the attitude of other Western Hemisphere governments toward the Canal question.

54. What are the attitudes of other Latin American states regarding diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba and US policies toward Cuba?

55. What changes are there in Cuban attitudes regarding the normalization of relations with the US?

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### **Substantive Objective**

*Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments relevant to US international economic policy decisions and negotiations.*

### **Key Intelligence Questions**

#### **Prospects for Inflation and Recession**

56. What are the changes in the measures of current performance and leading indicators of future performance of the economies of the major non-Communist industrial nations, especially Italy, [REDACTED] France, the

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Include these governments' domestic and foreign economic policy responses to those changes, and the likely effect of these responses on the future performance of these economies and the US economy.

#### **Multilateral Trade and Financial Negotiations**

57. What are the principal objectives of the major economic powers (especially France, [REDACTED] and Brazil) in forthcoming multilateral trade (GATT) and financial negotiations (IMF)?

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Include their possible negotiating tradeoffs and the electoral and intra-governmental factors that affect these objectives and tradeoffs. With respect to multilateral trade negotiations, appraise the consequences of alternative trade agreements to the US foreign trade balance.

#### **Major Oil Exporters' Activities**

58. What are the changes in composition and location of the foreign assets of the major oil exporting countries, and what are their policies with respect to channeling funds on longer terms than heretofore through multilateral institutions, the Eurodollar market, US financial markets and direct loans or grants to the LDCs?

59. What are the policies, negotiating positions and vulnerabilities of the major petroleum exporters with respect to the production and marketing of oil, and how are these policies affected by the prospects for development of non-OPEC energy sources?

#### **Policies of Producers of Important Raw Materials Other Than Petroleum**

60. What changes in production, control and pricing policies are the major producers of important raw materials or primary products, [REDACTED] considering either individually or in concert?

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#### **Effects of Price Changes on Major LDCs**

61. How have changes in the relative prices of imports and exports (petroleum, fertilizer and grain in particular) affected the food supply, foreign trade and prospects for economic growth and political stability of the major LDCs (especially India, Pakistan, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico and South Korea)?

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**Foreign Demand for US Agricultural Products**

25X6A 62. What is the likely demand (especially by the USSR, China, India, [REDACTED] for imports of wheat, soybeans, rice, corn and cotton, and what are the capabilities of countries other than the US (especially [REDACTED] Argentina, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Brazil and Thailand) for supplying these commodities to the world market?

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**Foreign Trade Opportunities**

63. What actions are being taken or planned by foreign governments or private groups that could substantially affect the ability of American business to compete for foreign sales or construction contracts whose size or circumstances are such as to involve the US interest in an important way?

Examples are sales of aircraft, nuclear power plants, enriched uranium and major construction programs such as the Suez pipeline.

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## **Additional Key Intelligence Questions**

### **Nuclear Proliferation**

- JAF 64. What are the objectives, programs and capabilities of countries other than the US, USSR, UK, France and the PRC for developing or acquiring nuclear weapons and delivery systems?

Include policies and actions of other countries (including nuclear powers) toward assisting the non-nuclear states in acquiring a nuclear capability.

### **Law of the Sea**

65. What are the negotiating positions and bargaining vulnerabilities of key countries on the form and content of a Law of the Sea treaty?

Give particular attention to issues on which the attitudes and intentions of these countries are likely to be so contentious as to jeopardize prospects for a treaty even minimally acceptable to the United States.

### **Narcotics**

66. Who are the major producers and traffickers in illicit narcotics, and what are their methods of operation?

Include the location of their production areas, laboratories and storage facilities, and how and by what routes and timing they move illicit narcotics to the United States.

67. How effective are the anti-narcotics programs of Mexico, France, Turkey, Thailand, Burma and Laos?

Include the willingness of these governments to cooperate with US efforts to expose and prosecute producers, traffickers and their collaborators.

### **Activities of Terrorist or Extremist Groups**

68. What are the composition, intentions and capabilities of foreign terrorist or extremist groups?

Include their sources of funds and weapons, the possibility of seizure or production and use of weapons of mass destruction (BW-CW as well as nuclear), the issues with which they identify, their relations with other like-minded groups, the extent of government support or opposition, their impact on government policy and stability in their host countries, and any evidence that Moscow or Peking is influencing or rendering direct support to the terrorist groups.

69. What indications are there that the oil exporting countries plan to use their increasing wealth for political or subversive purposes?

Include such activities as support for terrorist groups, loans to third parties for the purchase of arms and loans and subsidies to political groupings or national governments.

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